Abstract. We provide the first two-party protocol allowing Alice and Bob to evaluate privately even against active adversaries any completely positive, trace-preserving map F ∈ L(Ain ⊗ Bin) → L(Aout ⊗ Bout), given as a quantum circuit, upon their joint quantum input state ρin ∈ D(Ain ⊗ Bin). Our protocol leaks no more to any active adversary than an ideal functionality for F provided Alice and Bob have the cryptographic resources for active secure two-party classical computation. Our protocol is constructed from the protocol for the same task secure against specious adversaries presented in [DNS10] .
Introduction
We provide the first active-secure two-party protocol for computing on quantum data. We look at a model where Alice and Bob hold an input ρ in on registers A in and B in , where Alice holds register A in and Bob holds B in . They agree on a completely positive, trace-preserving (CPTP) map F from registers A in ⊗ B in to registers A out ⊗ B out , and they want to compute ρ out = F (ρ in ) such that, at the end of the protocol, Alice is in possession of A out and Bob is in possession of B out . They want to do this in an actively secure manner. Our notion of active security is phrased via simulation, but intuitively it simply guarantees that any cheating Alice, even an infinitely powerful Alice, which might deviate from the protocol, can only affect the output of the protocol by replacing her own input and that she will at any point during the execution of the protocol only hold information which can be computed (efficiently) from either ρ A in or ρ A out . The equivalent condition should hold for Bob.
A simple example of such an F is the quantum swap, where A in = A out = A, B in = B out = B, and ρ A out = ρ B in and ρ B out = ρ A in . Securely implementing this unitary basically means to do an atomic swap of quantum states, which was shown impossible in [DNS10] even against a restricted class of adversaries called specious. Extra assumptions are therefore needed to get unconditional security. Our way out is to look at a model where the two parties have access to an ideal functionality which allows them to securely do any classical computation on any classical data held jointly by the two parties. In this model we give an unconditionally secure protocol with active security. This is the first such protocol.
Formally, we use the notationally simpler model of [DNS10] , but it is easy to see that security in this model implies security in the stand-alone model of [HSS11] , as long as the simulator is poly-time. The stand-alone model of [HSS11] allows, inside a secure quantum protocol, to replace a classical ideal functionality by a classical protocol which securely implements that ideal functionality against poly-time quantum adversaries. The result is a protocol secure against poly-time quantum adversaries. This, in particular, implies sequential security, i.e., if a protocol is secure, it remains secure when run in sequence with other secure protocols. Since the secure evaluation of any classical function with security against poly-time quantum adversaries can be done under the assumption that learning with errors is hard [Reg05, HSS11] and under the more general assumption that mixed commitment schemes exist [LN11] , our poly-time simulator provides an active-secure two-party plain-model protocol for computing on quantum data with security against any poly-time quantum adversaries. This is the first such protocol.
Overview of our construction
We reuse many ideas from the protocol provided in [DNS10] , which gives a two-party protocol for computing on quantum data securely against so-called specious adversaries. The protocol therein is unconditionally secure given an ideal functionality for classical computation. Specious adversaries are a quantum version of the classical notion of passive adversaries. Technically, a specious adversary is an adversary which is allowed to deviate from the protocol, except that at any step of the protocol it should be able to reconstruct the honest state of the protocol from its current state. This basically allows it to purify itself and not much else.
In the protocol in [DNS10] , all wires are encrypted using a Pauli encryption: a qubit |v is represented as |V = X x Z z |v , where the two uniform key bits x and z are secret-shared between Alice and Bob. For example, to secret-share x, Alice will hold a uniformly random bit x A and Bob will hold a uniformly random bit x B such that x = x A ⊕x B . All wires are independently encrypted like this, which ensures that intermediate states are perfectly hidden from both parties. Computation is then done "through the encryption". The CPTP map F is described by a quantum circuit made out of the universal set of gates UG consisting of gates X, Y, Z, CNOT, H = 1 √ 2
( 1 1 1 −1 ), P = ( 1 0 0 i ), and R = 1 0 0 e iπ/4 , together with a set of ancilla wires initialized in state |0 , and a set of output wires that are discarded (or, in our case, that remain encrypted forever). The protocol evaluates each gate of F while preserving privacy. Handling the Pauli gates X, Y and Z is easy, as they commute or anti-commute with the encryption operators. As an example, assume that the parties want to apply an X gate to a qubit |v , i.e., compute an encryption of |v = X|v . Since up to an overall phase factor XZ = ZX, it follows that X|V = XX x Z z |v = X x Z z X|v = X x Z z |v . So, the evaluation is simply performed on the encrypted qubit |V and the key bits x and z are maintained. For the remaining Clifford gates CNOT, H and P other "commutation" rules with X and Z are used. For H, it is used that HX = ZH and HZ = XH, so H is simply applied to the encrypted qubit, and then the keys x and z are swapped: Alice sets x A = z A and z A = x A and similarly for Bob. This leaves the non-Clifford gate R, where the relation RX x Z z = P x X x Z z R almost does the job, except that it leaves an extra P x . Getting rid of this requires quantum communication and a classical secure two-party computation, which computes how the parties should update their key bits. After such a gate-by-gate computation of U on the encrypted qubits, the shares of the keys needed for learning the states on ones own output wires are swapped with the other party in one atomic step, using the ideal functionality for classical secure computation.
The protocol in [DNS10] is actually secure against an active adversary up to the final swap of key bits, as the encryptions of the wires are guaranteed to be perfect, independent of the behavior of the other party, as the parties pick their own shares of the sharings of x and z. This means that no party can get any information on any intermediary states, no matter how it deviates. It can, however, easily force the computation to be incorrect, by applying gates to the encrypted states, so the full protocol is not active secure. We note, however, that [DNS10] is secure against what we could call ultimately specious adversaries: Adversaries promising to attack in such a way that both parties always be able to reconstruct the correct state at the end of the protocol, but that can otherwise behave as they want. This follows from the active security in the middle and a theorem in [DNS10] which says that any attack which always allows both parties to obtain the correct output can be simulated given just the output of the corrupted party-basically, there is no way to learn extra information without sometimes irrevocably destroying the state of the other party.
In this paper, we use this observation in a protocol proceeding along the same lines as [DNS10] but where we force the adversary to be ultimately specious. This is done by not only encrypting the wires, but by unconditionally authenticating them. In addition, we commit the parties to their key bits, to allow the recipient to verify the key bits swapped at the end. Since an unconditional quantum authentication code is also an unconditionally secure encryption, we get a protocol with at least the security of [DNS10] , but with the added property that an adversary who deviates from the protocol will be caught. More technically, if all checks of the authentication code succeed, then the authenticated values collapse to the correct values. This forces the adversary to either be detected or be ultimately specious. Since we do all the checks of the authentication codes before any key bits are revealed, the case where the adversary is detected can be simulated by simply asking the ideal world to abort too. The case where the adversary is ultimately specious is simulated similarly to [DNS10] .
The main technical challenge is then to devise an authentication code with these two properties:
1. It allows to perform computation "through the authentication". 2. It allows to check the authentication code without revealing what is authenticated.
The first property is important for hiding intermediate values during the computation. The second property is important when we force the adversary to either be detected or ultimately specious: when he is detected, he should learn nothing on the incorrect outputs.
We devise an authentication code with these properties based on the Clifford-based quantum authentication code proposed in [ABE08] . It authenticates a quantum message using a random unitary implementable using gates X, Y, Z, CNOT, H and P. The authentication works as follows. In order to satisfy the second property, take a qubit |v on some wire. Alice prepends n new wires, in the all-zero state |0 n . Then she applies a uniformly random (n + 1)-bit Clifford operator A to the n + 1 wires. She then sends the state to Bob, who appends n more wires in the all-zero state and applies a uniformly random (2n + 1)-bit Clifford operator B to the 2n + 1 wires. We can write this as |V = B(|0 n ⊗ A(|v |0 n )). The key is (A, B). This authentication can be checked in two different ways. Either, apply B † to the authenticated state and check that the first n wires are all zero. Or, apply B † and then apply A † to the last n + 1 wires and check that the last n wires are all zero. One way is used for Alice to check that Bob did not change the authenticated value. The other is used by Bob to check Alice. In order to perform these without leakage, we use a 2-party classical ideal functionality as described below.
In our scheme, Alice will hold A as her share of the key and Bob will hold B as his key share. They are committed to their share by being committed to a poly-size classical description of the operator applied. We sketch why the scheme has the two necessary properties.
1. Since the authentication is performed using only Clifford gates, an approach as in [DNS10] will allow to fairly easily apply Clifford gates "through the authentication". Since the Clifford unitaries form a group, the operation consisting of decrypting a qubit, applying a Clifford gate to it and reauthenticating it using a different key is also Clifford unitary. Hence, we can apply a Clifford gate to a swaddled qubit simply by changing the authentication keys in the appropriate manner. More precisely, to execute the Clifford gate G ∈ C 1 , Alice updates her key to A(G † ⊗ 1 n ), and Alice and Bob use a TPC to update Alice's commitment to her key. Executing CNOT gates is similar, but involves two swaddlings. The R-gate requires new techniques reminiscent of the fault tolerant implementation of it [Sho96,Got97,Got10]. The details appear within, but we basically reduce it to securely producing a state |0 , a magic state, a measurement in the computational basis, and applying secure Clifford gates together with a carefully chosen secure classical computation which tells the parties how to update their keys. 2. If Bob is to check an authenticated qubit, we simply give him |V and he applies B † and measures the first n wires, rejecting if they are not all zero. After that he re-applies B to recover the authentication |V . If Alice is to perform the check, we perform a secure classical computation where the inputs are the committed descriptions of A and B which effectively swaps the inner and outer authentications (see below for details). Alice then holds the outermost authentication and can easily test its integrity.
The final state of the computation is obtained after each party reveals the authentication keys needed by the other party to open its output wires.
Preliminaries
We refer to [DNS10] for a more complete introduction to the notation used throughout. In the following, various Hilbert spaces will be seen as collections of wires, represented in lower-case typewriter font (such as w, x, y); each wire represents a qubit involved in a computation. We will denote by w ∈ A the fact that w is part of the system A. In the following, registers like A are considered as being composed by a set of wires or qubit registers. Henceforth, we shall denote a negligible function in n by negl(n).
The set of positive semi-definite operators on A is denoted by Pos(A) and the one with where E j ∈ L(A, B) satisfies j E † j E j = 1 A and Φ(ρ) = j E j ρE † j , for any ρ ∈ Pos(A).
Another, yet equivalent, way to represent any quantum operation is through a linear isometry W ∈ L(A, B ⊗ Z) such that Φ(ρ) = tr Z (W ρW † ), for some extra space Z. Any such isometry W can be implemented by a physical process as long as resources to implement the space Z are available. This is just a unitary transform in U(A ⊗ Z) where the system in Z is initially in known state
, we denote by ∆(ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) the trace norm distance between ρ 0 and ρ 1 :
The Pauli group on one qubit is defined as P 1 := {±1, ±i1, ±X, ±iX, ±Y, ±iY, ±Z, ±iZ} while the n-qubit Pauli group is simply P n := P ⊗n 1 . We denote by C n := {U ∈ U(H 2 n ) : (∀σ ∈ P n )[U σU † ∈ P n ]}, the set of all Clifford operators acting on n qubits. The Clifford group is just the set of n-qubit unitary operators U with the property that for all Pauli operators σ ∈ P n , we have σ ∈ P n such that U σ = σ U .
Secure Two-Party Classical Computation Against Quantum Adversaries
Our protocol will use various classical two-party computations throughout its execution, each modeled as an ideal functionality. Recent work [LN11, HSS11] show that composable classical two-party computation protocols can be devised with security against quantum adversaries provided some classical computational assumptions hold against this class of adversaries. One example of such an assumption is learning with errors is hard [Reg05, HSS11] . The framework in [HSS11] allows us to replace the ideal functionalities with such secure protocols. Here we therefore focus on proving security given the ideal functionalities.
In the following, the ideal functionality for string commitment will be denoted by id SC . It is defined as follows:
In order for Alice to commit on s ∈ {0, 1} * , Alice and Bob call id SC ((id, s), ⊥), where id is an unused identifier chosen by Alice. In order for Bob to commit on s, Alice and Bob call id SC (⊥, (id, s)), where id is chosen by Bob. The opening of a commitment is performed by calling the ideal functionality id OPEN defined as:
Note that state has to be passed from id SC ( , ) to id OPEN ( , ) for the above descriptions to make sense. Our framework exactly allows that an ideal functionality from an earlier round passes its state to an ideal functionality in a later round. In the framework of [HSS11] they would be considered one ideal functionality, with a state. We prefer the above notation for brevity of later protocol descriptions.
Ideal functionalities computing functions applied to committed values can now be easily defined. Suppose that Alice and Bob want to let Alice learn a function f : {0, 1} * ×{0, 1} * → {0, 1} * upon two committed values, s and s , where s is committed upon by Alice under id and s is committed upon by Bob under id . It suffices to define the ideal functionality id * f as
The same if it is Bob who is to learn the output, but with id *
The same construction can be used to implement any efficiently computable function f evaluated upon any number of committed values. The ideal functionality can also easily be extended to produce commitments to the outputs of f . It is this extended ideal functionality we use most often. Again, id * f (·, ·) will have to share state with id SC (·, ·) and id OPEN (·, ·), which is allowed in our framework.
Note that all the above ideal functionalities are defined such that at most one party has a nontrivial output (i.e., an output which is not known before the inputs are provided). We avoid using functions where both parties have a non-trivial output as an easy way to deal with the problem that fairness in classical secure two-party computation is provably impossible for most functionalities. It is not hard to see that it follows from known completeness results of quantum-secure classical two-party computation [LN11, HSS11] that the classical ideal functionalities specified above can be implemented with security against poly-time quantum adversaries. We skip the details of this, as our focus here is on using the classical ideal functionalities for constructing secure two-party protocols for computing on quantum data.
Clifford-Based Quantum Authentication
In order to detect misbehaviors of an active adversary, we will be evaluating a circuit upon authenticated quantum bits. We will be using a quantum authentication scheme (QAS) [BCG + 02] based on Clifford operators introduced in [ABE08] as our main building block. Definition 2.1 (Quantum authentication scheme). A quantum authentication scheme is a set of encryption and decryption superoperators
where K is the set of possible keys, S is the input system, C is the ciphertext system, and F is a "flag" system that contains either |acc or |rej . A QAS is such that for all
A QAS is secure if it satisfies the following: 
This definition can be shown to be equivalent to the existence of a simulator that interacts only with an ideal functionality in which Eve's only choice is whether or not to destroy the state and cause a rejection.
Definition 2.3 (Clifford-based QAS[ABE08]).
Let S be an s-qubit system, A be an n-qubit system, and let C = S ⊗ A. Let K index all Clifford unitaries C k on s + n qubits. Then, the Clifford-based QAS is defined by the following encryption and decryption maps where
where π SA is an arbitrary fixed state that the decoder outputs when it rejects the authentication.
The following establishes the security of the QAS based on random Clifford operators. The proof of security is more or less the same as in [ABE08] and is provided in Appendix C for completeness:
Theorem 2.4 (Security of Clifford-based QAS). The QAS defined above is ε(n)-secure for ε(n) = 6 × 2 −n .
It should be mentioned that picking a random Clifford operation acting upon qubits requires to pick a uniformly random poly( )-bit classical key k and the mapping between k and the corresponding Clifford operation can be performed efficiently [Got97,ABE08]. In other words, the key size of the Clifford-based QAS is polynomial in the number of qubits = s + n used to authenticate an s-qubit quantum state.
Two-Party Quantum Protocols
We define two-party strategies in a similar way as in [DNS10, GW07] , with some adaptations made for the fact that we are computing a CPTP map and not just a unitary and that we allow ideal functionalities of different rounds to share states (equivalent to considering one, stateful functionality). Two-party protocols for the evaluation of some CPTP map are particular cases of two-party strategies. Two-party strategies have access to some oracle in each round. An oracle is just a CPTP map acting on registers at both Alice and Bob. Oracles implement some functionalities like a communication channel or some more complex two-party functionalities.
An m-turn two-party strategy with oracle calls is defined by tuples of quantum operations
are the actions performed at turn i by Alice and Bob respectively. The operation . We make one exception to this general form, the last turn (that is turn m + 1) of a strategy does not invoke any oracle, and is there simply to allow Alice and Bob to post-process the output of the last oracle.
Let Π = (A , B, O, m) be an m-turn two-party strategy with oracle calls. The final state of the interaction between A and B upon joint input state ρ in ∈ D(A 0 ⊗ B 0 ⊗ R), where R is a reference system with dim R = dim A 0 dim B 0 , is denoted by A two-party hybrid protocol for
is a m-turn two-party strategy with oracle calls, where
In the following, we often write simply two-party protocol to refer to a two-party hybrid protocol.
Modeling Active Security
We start by extending the framework in [DNS10] to handle active security. Our model is very standard, defining security via simulation, but for completeness we describe and motivate the changes made in Appendix B.
O the resulting m-turn two-party strategies. We will as usual define the security of such actively attacked protocols by comparing to a simulation. The simulation is basically an ideally secure evaluation of F . The ideally secure protocol for evaluating F would be in a world where F actually existed as an oracle-the parties would simply call this oracle. We can, however, not expect any protocol to be as secure as this, as for most protocols we cannot ensure that either both parties get the output or no party gets the output, known as fairness, which is ensured in the above ideal setting. We will therefore consider a setting where one of the parties learns its output first, and where the party learning it first, if corrupted, can prevent the other party from learning its output. We will only give the definition for the case where Alice learns first. Deriving the definition for the symmetric case where Bob learns first is trivial.
To avoid confusion between the parties in the real protocol and in the ideal protocol, we formulate the ideal protocol with parties Charleen, C, and Dan, D, taking the seats of Alice respectively Bob. So, we look at an ideal functionality
, but where we keep a mental note reminding that
The ideal protocol for F is then a 2-turn two-party hybrid protocol Γ F = (C , D, F , 2), which lets the parties query F in turn 1, but only letting C see her output in turn 1. In turn 2, Charleen then inputs a bit f , with f = 1 indicating that Dan should receive his output and f = 0 indicating that Dan should not receive his output. Dan will receive f , and if f = 1 he will additionally be given his output. This is handled by the second oracle. Then the parties output whatever they received from the oracles. In the honest protocol, Charleen always inputs f = 1. We call this the ideal protocol for evaluating F without fairness for Dan.
The ideal protocol Γ F = (C , D, F , 2) for F without fairness for Dan: 1. By convention we have C0 = Cin and D0 = Din while O0 is empty. In the ideal protocol, we let C 
), we set C F ,out 1 ≈ Cout, O1 ≈ Dout and we let D F ,out 1 be empty. F1 simply applies the quantum operation F to the inputs supplied by the parties and sends Charleen's output to Charleen in C F ,out 1 . Dan's output is saved in the internal state O1 of the oracle, giving Dan no output so far. 2. We let C2 ≈ C F ,out 1 ≈ Cout and we let C F ,in 2 be a one qubit register, holding a qubit denoted |f . We let C2 moves the output from the oracle stored in C F ,out 1 to C2 and sets |f = |1 in C F ,in 2 . D2 does nothing at this point.
), we let C F ,out 2 and O2 be empty, and we let D . When Charleen inputs f = 1, Dan will get his output. If f = 0, Dan gets no output, except a bit a = 0 telling him that Charleen cheated him of his output (we say that Charleen aborted the computation). 3. We let C3 := Cout ≈ C2 and D3 := Dout ≈ D F ,out 2 . C3 and D3 simply output whatever they received from F1 and F2 in C2 and D F ,out 2 respectively, except qubit |a in the latter register. When the execution has aborted, Dan outputs a dummy state.
Consider the powers of a corrupted Charleen,C . She might in the first round provide an alternative input for F , possibly saving her original input, or a part thereof, in some ancilla. This is input substitution. Her choice of alternative input can only depend on her own original input, not that of Dan. This is input independence. Then she learns only the output of the oracle. This is privacy. After learning her own output she might then specify that Dan is not to learn his output. This is the necessary lack of fairness. A corrupted Dan has similar powers, except that he cannot abort after seeing his output. We then say that a protocol is secure if it only allows attacks which could be mounted in the ideal protocol, i.e., it only allows the inevitable attack. 
If a protocol is δ-active secure for δ = 0, then it is called perfectly active secure. If it is δ-active secure for δ negligible in some security parameter n, then it is called statistically active secure (in n).
Securely Swaddling Wires to Ensure Ultimate Speciousness
The Clifford based QAS, described in Sect. 2.2, can be used to share the authentication of a quantum message in a way that allows any of the players, when helped by a TPC, to verify that a state has not been tampered with, and this without being able to get information on the encoded state. This primitive will be used extensively in our protocol to ensure that both players are ultimately specious. It relies on a string commitment scheme and secure TPCs provided as oracles, as described in Sect. 2.1. The basic idea consists in swaddling each input wire w into a set of 2n dummy wires where n belongs to Alice and n belongs to Bob. No party will be able to extract information about the state of the original wire from the swaddling. Moreover, any attempt to modify the state of the original wire will be detected except with negligible probability in n. The subprotocol Swaddle(w), described below, uses two applications of the Clifford-based QAS (one on top of the other) in order to achieve this. Alice authenticates the state of her wire w and commits to her authentication key K w,a using identifier id A (w). She then sends the resulting system to Bob who authenticates it using key K w,b that he also commits upon using identifier id B (w). Bob sends back the resulting system to Alice allowing her to test the validity of the swaddling. The swaddling therefore uses a total of 2n + 1 wires, where Alice holds the innermost and Bob the outermost key of the resulting swaddling s(w) for wire w.
Consider now the test performed by Alice at Step 7. Let A and B be the Clifford operators corresponding to keys K w,a and K w,b respectively. Notice that Alice can easily test the authenticity of a swaddling when she holds the outermost authentication. She simply applies A † upon the 2n + 1 wires, measures her n dummy wires in the computational basis to verify that they are in state |0 n . She then re-applies A to the 2n + 1 wires of the swaddling. If Alice holds the innermost authentication of the swaddling, the testing procedure relies on the ideal functionality id TEST defined as:
where K w,a , and K w,b correspond to random Clifford operations A ∈ C 2n+1 and B ∈ C n+1 respectively, and t corresponds to Clifford T ∈ C 2n+1 subject to:
Swaddle(W), with W ⊆ A: 1. Alice initializes n · #W dummy wires in state |0 . 2. For each w ∈ W, Alice randomly chooses Clifford Kw,a on n + 1 qubits, commits to it in idSC((idA(w), Kw,a), ⊥), and applies it to w and her dummies. 3. Alice sends these #W · (n + 1) wires to Bob. 4. Bob initializes #W · n dummy wires in the state |0 . 5. For each w ∈ W, Bob randomly chooses a Clifford K w,b on 2n + 1 qubits, commits to it in idSC(⊥, (idB(w), K w,b )), and applies it to the n + 1 wires received from Alice as well as his own dummies. 6. Bob sends all #W · (2n + 1) wires back to Alice. Let s(w) denote the resulting swaddling of w ∈ W. 7. For each w ∈ W, Alice calls TestSwaddling(s(w)).
Condition 1 ensures that the authentication keys with identifiers id A (w) and id B (w) have been updated to hold values K w,a and K w,b respectively. Conditions 2 makes sure that the state |σ of a valid swaddling s(w) satisfies T |σ = |0 n ⊗ B (|ϕ ⊗ |0 n ), where |ϕ is the logical state of s(w). Notice that Alice gets no information about Bob's Clifford B if she had no information about B to start with. The security of Swaddle(w) will be established in Appendix G.
TestSwaddling(s(w)), with Alice doing the testing: 1. If Alice holds the outermost authentication key Kw,a then:
-Alice applies A † on s(w), where A is the Clifford corresponding to string Kw,a, -Alice tests that her dummies are together in state |0
n . Otherwise, she aborts. -Alice re-applies A on the 2n + 1 qubits of the swaddling. 2. Else they call ((t, K w,a ), K w,b ) = idTEST((idA(w), idB(w)), (idA(w), idB(w))),
-If one party gets ⊥ in idTEST then abort.
-Alice applies T on s(w) where T is the Clifford operator corresponding to string t.
-Alice tests that her dummies are together in state |0 n . Otherwise, she aborts. -Alice applies A to the the 2n + 1 qubits of the swaddling (note that A and B are committed upon with identifiers idA(w) and idB(w) respectively).
At the end of TestSwaddling(s(w)), Alice holds the outermost authentication key K w,a of the resulting swaddling. Bob can do the testing by the exact same procedure provided the roles of Alice and Bob are reversed in TestSwaddling(s(w)). The security of these procedures will be discussed in Sect. 5.5. Intuitively, we expect that TestSwaddling(s(w)) allows parties to test that a swaddling s(w) has not been tampered with. It will also be used to test that each party transforms a swaddling s(w) the way they should during the execution of the protocol. Notice that no information about the logical state of wire w leaks to any party in Swaddle(w) and TestSwaddling(s(w)) since statistically secure authentication must also encrypt w [BCG + 02].
At the end of the our protocol, each party will be asked to verify that the other party's registers upon which the circuit is evaluated are all in the states they should be. This subprotocol is called TestAllSwaddlings. It simply consists in the execution of TestSwaddling(s(w)) for all wires w held by each party. 
with Alice doing the testing.
The following subprotocol implements the obvious way the openings of all committed Clifford operators, thereby allowing Alice and Bob to get the final state of the computation. Notice that since Alice learns Bob's secret keys before she unveils her own, our protocol will lack fairness for Bob.
OpenAllSwaddlings:
1. For each wire w ∈ Aout, Bob reveals to Alice his committed secret key encrypting w, with identifier idB(w), by calling idOPEN(idB(w), idB(w)). If Alice or Bob get ⊥ from the ideal functionality then abort. 2. For each wire w ∈ Bout, Alice reveals to Bob her committed secret key encrypting w, with identifier idA(w), by calling idOPEN(idA(w), idA(w)). If Alice or Bob get ⊥ from the ideal functionality then abort.
Description of the protocol
We first start by defining the various spaces on which (the honest) Alice and Bob will be working. The circuit that they want to execute acts on some wires in Alice's possession and some in Bob's possession, and these will be swaddled as described above. We will denote by A u , B u the spaces corresponding to Alice and Bob's unswaddled wires, reserving A and B for the actual swaddled wires.
The core idea of our protocol is the same as in [DNS10] : we first initialize all the qubits by swaddling them, we then perform each gate from the circuit one after the other on the authenticated data. Hence, we need to give subprotocols for the initialization as well as for each of the gates in our universal set.
For all Clifford gates (i.e., all gates in UG except for R), the subprotocols are fairly simple: we use classical two-party computation to reveal a Clifford operation that executes the gate while updating the encryption key; the revealed Clifford then looks uniformly distributed and independent of everything else.
Implementing the R-gate is more involved. We use ideas from fault-tolerant computation, where this gate is implemented by doing gate teleportation via a so-called magic state: one prepares a special state (namely |M = 1 √ 2 (|0 + e iπ/4 |1 )) and then use a teleportation-like circuit, which itself requires only Clifford gates and measurements, to execute the gate. The problem is then reduced to that of producing this magic state, which can be done by a distillation process. The distillation process that we use is exactly the one considered in [BK05] (where |M is an "H-type magic state" in their language); a description of it can also be found in Appendix D.
Main Protocol
We now give the full description of our protocol, denoted
The oracle list needed to run the protocol in the hybrid model is provided implicitly in Sect. 5. The operations performed at each step by A and B are described informally as the instructions of Alice and Bob respectively. We will view F as being implemented by a quantum circuit acting on A in ⊗ B in together with ancillas A a and B a initialized in state |0 (we shall explain below how to test that ancillas are really in state |0 ). At the end of the circuit, some of these wires become part of the outputs A out and B out , and the rest are part of the environment that will remain encrypted (A e and B e ). In the following, we denote by U F ∈ U(A in ⊗ A a ⊗ B in ⊗ B a ) the unitary transform implemented by the circuit that satisfies, for all mixed quantum state ρ
where
be an enumeration of all gates of the circuit for F where (n) is polynomial in n, and G i is executed before G i+1 . This protocol calls a number of subprotocols described next and in Appendix E. 
. (n):
-If Gi is a one-bit Clifford gate applied to wire w then Alice and Bob call OneQubitClifford(Gi, s(w)), -If Gi is a CNOT-gate applied to control wire wc and wt then Alice and Bob call CNOT(s(wc), s(wt)), -If Gi is an R-gate applied to wire w then Alice and Bob call RGate(s(w)), 3. Alice and Bob call TestAllSwaddlings, 4. Alice and Bob call OpenAllSwaddlings , 5. Alice and Bob decrypt the swaddlings for all wires in Aout and Bout using the keys received by the other party together with their own.
Subprotocols
The Initialization subprotocol prepares all swaddlings required during the evaluation of the circuit. In addition to swaddling all wires holding the qubits upon which the circuit acts, some ancillary states also have to be swaddled: one wire in the magic state and one wire in state |0 per R-gate in the circuit.
Initialization:
1. For each R-gate being applied to a wire in A, Alice adds one additional wire ma,i initialized in state |M =
2. For each R-gate being applied to a wire in B, Bob adds an additional wire m b,i initialized in state |M to B.
3. For each R-gate being applied to a wire in B, Alice adds an additional wire ca,i initialized in state |0 to A. 4. For each R-gate being applied to a wire in A, Bob adds an additional wire c b,i initialized in state |0 to B.
Alice calls Swaddle(A).

Bob calls Swaddle(B).
7. For every wire a ∈ Aa or added in step 3 above, Alice calls VerifyAncilla(s(a)). 8. For every wire a ∈ Ba or added in step 4 above, Bob calls VerifyAncilla(s(a)). 9. For each magic wire m ∈ A, Alice calls DistillMagic(s(m)).
For each magic wire m ∈ B, Bob calls DistillMagic(s(m)).
Subprotocols VerifyAncilla(s(a)) and DistillMagic(s(m)) are described in Appendices E and D. The following subprotocols evaluates any one-qubit Clifford, the CNOT-gate, respectively the R. The idea behind the one-qubit protocol is to use TPC to compute the gate through the authentication. The idea in the CNOT-subprotocol is to take the two swaddled qubits involved and turn them into one big swaddling. Then, performing a CNOT on them is no different from performing any other Clifford gate on the whole block. We then separate the big swaddling back into its components. To express the TPCs needed for these subprotocols, we will need to define some more ideal functionalities. For the one-qubit Clifford gates, we will define id 1QC , which simply updates the commitment to the inner key of the swaddling: a call to id 1QC ((i, G), (i , G ) ), if i = i = id A (w) for some wire w for which Alice has the inner swaddling and G = G is some one-qubit Clifford, results in the commitments to the key K w,a to be updated to commitments to K w,a G † (and likewise when Bob holds the inner key).
The subprotocols are then as follows:
OneQubitClifford(C, s(w)): 1. If Alice has the inner swaddling of w, Alice and Bob call id1QC((idA(w), C), (idA(w), C)), otherwise they call id1QC((idB(w), C), (idB(w), C)).
CNOT(s(wc), s(wt)) with wire wc ∈ A as control and wt as target: 1. Bob sends s(wt) to Alice if Bob holds it, in which case Alice calls TestDummies(s(wt)).
Alice performs a randomly selected Clifford C on 4n + 2 qubits jointly on s(wc) and s(wt).
3. Alice sends s(wc) and s(wt) to Bob; Bob calls TestDummies jointly on them.
Alice and Bob perform a TPC whose outcome tells Bob to perform a Clifford unitary
where K is the key of the swaddling at this point, and K c and K t are randomly-chosen Cliffords that become the new key. 5. Bob sends s(wc) (and s(wt) if she held this one too) to Alice. Alice calls TestDummies on them.
RGate(s(w)) with w ∈ A: 1. 2. Alice performs a swaddled CNOT with mw as a control, and w as target. 3. Alice sends s(w) to Bob. Bob calls TestSwaddling(s(w)) on it. 4. Alice calls Measure(s(w)). 5. Alice and Bob perform a TPC whose result is a Clifford which, if both measurement results were zero, updates the key, and if both measurement results were one, performs a swaddled e iπ/4 XP † and then updates the key. If the measurement results differ, then they abort. 6. Alice relabels ma,i to w.
The RGate subprotocol performs the R-gate using gate teleportation [GC99b, GC99a] via the magic state similarly to the fault-tolerant version of the R-gate introduced in [Got10, Sho96] . To perform an R-gate on a wire w via gate teleportation, we would first perform a CNOT from the magic state to w, and then measure w in the computational basis. If the answer is 0, we do nothing, and if it is 1, we perform e iπ/4 XP † on the former magic state, that we then rename w. Measure(s(w)) is described in Appendix E.
Security of the subprotocols
We will now show that the protocol described in the previous section has the following property: any adversary which deviates significantly from the protocol will be caught cheating with high probability. The general strategy will be as follows. For the initialization, any adversary will be forced to input something into the protocol, and will end up with some state that is properly swaddled. Then, for every other protocol step, we will assume that at the beginning, the inputs are properly swaddled, and will aim to show that after the protocol step is done, we are once again left with a correct swaddling of the data, to which the correct operation has been applied. Furthermore, at every step, any deviation from the protocol will be essentially equivalent to an attack on the authentication scheme, which means that an adversary's chances of succeeding in changing the state without getting caught will be negligible in the number of dummy wires per qubit.
Some additional definitions
Before we start, we will find it convenient to introduce some additional notation. From now on, ρ 0 will consist of ρ in augmented with all additional qubits introduced in the Initialization phase: the additional ancillas, and the dummy wires Alice and Bob use for swaddling. Furthermore, we will denote by K a and K b systems which represent Alice's and Bob's current key, respectively. These should be thought of as being part of the inner state of the TPC ideal functionality, and therefore cannot be changed at will. A represents all other systems at Alice, B represents all systems in Bob's possession, and R is a system that includes everything else and ensures that the total state is pure.
In the sequel, we will call a step an execution of any of the subprotocols listed above; each of these steps consists of multiple turns in the sense of Section 2.3: the state at turn i consists of the state before the ith use of an oracle in the protocol (either a communication oracle or a classical computation oracle).
We will denote by C a,s the operation that encodes Alice's qubits according to the keys stored in the TPC ideal functionalities at turn s in the protocol, and likewise for Bob's encoding operation C b,s . See Appendix F for more precise definitions. Furthermore, we will denote by
the global state of the protocol at turn s conditioned on the fact that the protocol doesn't abort before TestAllSwaddlings is completed. Note that this state is not normalized; its trace corresponds to the probability of not aborting before the end.
Definition 5.1 (Forcing). We will say that the protocol is G AB -forcing forÃ at turn s with initial operationẼ A 0 if there exists a final operationẼ A such that:
whereẼ 0 is a completely positive, trace non-increasing map that acts only on qubits in Alice's possession at the beginning of the protocol: her own input qubits, the dummies she inputs in the swaddling, and the various ancillas that she adds.
In other words, if the protocol is G -forcing for Alice at some turn s, then, if the protocol doesn't abort early, regardless of what she tries to do, it will be essentially equivalent to changing her input (using the initial operationẼ 0 ), executing the operation G (which will turn out to be the circuit that is supposed to be executed up to turn s), swaddling the result, and then doing an arbitrary operation on her share alone, represented byẼ .
Definition 5.2. We say that a subprotocol is G -forcing if the protocol is G • G 0 -forcing at the end of the subprotocol given that it was G 0 -forcing at the beginning.
Definition 5.3 (Hiding).
We will say that the protocol is hiding forÃ at turn s, if, for all input states ρ
, we have that
Hence, the protocol is hiding if the state seen by a dishonest Alice is independent of Bob's input. Note that this in particular implies thatÃ 's action at turn s is necessarily independent of Bob's input.
Proving hidingness and forcingness
To construct the simulator needed to prove security, we will need to show two things. First, we will have to show that before the keys are revealed, the cheater's internal state can be produced by running the protocol internally with a dummy input from the honest party; this will follow from the fact that the Clifford QAS is a secure encryption scheme. Second, we will have to show that after the keys are revealed, the correct circuit has been applied. These two properties correspond to the "hiding" and "forcing" properties defined in the previous section, and proving these for our protocol will be the focus of this section. The fact that the protocol is hiding simply follows from the security of the Clifford QAS as an encryption scheme; we state this as a lemma below. To prove forcingness, the usual trick will be to assume that we pass every call to TestDummies in the protocol (since we only need to look at the no-early-abort case) and use the security definition of the Clifford QAS (Definition 2.2) to show that the dishonest party's attack can be represented by a completely positive, trace non-increasing map U acc that acts only on his/her other systems (i.e. the ones that were not involved in the TestDummies). If the adversary decides to try to break the QAS at this step, this U acc will simply decrease the trace to reflect the probability of abortion. We prove the forcingness of the various subprotocols in Appendix G, and simply summarize the end result as Lemma 5.5 below.
Lemma 5.4. For every turn before OpenAllSwaddlings, the protocol is hiding for every adversaryÃ andB.
Proof. During this phase of the protocol, allÃ ever gets from Bob (andB from Alice) is encrypted in a QAS, whose key is managed by the classical two-party computations. Hence, this follows directly from the security of the Clifford QAS (see Section 2.2 and Appendix C).
Lemma 5.5. All subprotocols are G -forcing for anyÃ andB, where G is the operation performed by the subprotocol.
Proving Active Security
In this section, we prove active security of Π O F by providing a simulatorC . We prove that for any shared input state, whenC interacts with D, it reproduces the state generated byÃ interacting with B on that same input state.
At the beginning,C simulates the view of any execution betweenÃ and B that aborts before all swaddlings are opened. This part of the simulation is described and analyzed in the next subsection. In Sect. 6.2, we provide and analyze the simulation when no early aborting occurs betweenÃ and B.
Simulation of Early Aborting Executions
Here is the rough description ofC 's operations for the start of the simulation. These steps allow to simulate any execution aborting in the real world before the adversaryÃ receives back all her swaddlings from B in TestAllSwaddlings. Let s * be the turn in Π O F at which this transmission is received byÃ . The simulatorC runsÃ as a subroutine using an internal copy of B's instructions run upon a (or any) dummy input state |0 B in . We denote by B * the simulated B on a dummy input run internally inC . In order to distinguish the registers of the real B from the ones of B * , register B of B will be denoted by B * when used by B * . Consider the simulatorC starting its simulation as follows:
1.C simulates the protocol execution betweenÃ and B * holding the dummy input state |0 n B * in until turn s * is reached. Remember thatC simulates all oracle calls during the execution betweenÃ and B * . In particularC stores all queries to classical oracles made byÃ and B * .
2. If the execution aborts at any point beforeÃ and B * reach turn s * thenC aborts as well after having deleted all its internal registers except the ones held byÃ .
At
Step 2 ,C and B * aborts with the same probability as a real world execution aborts prior to turn s * . The simulation reproducesÃ 's view in the real world when such an aborting execution occurs. This follows from the fact that up to that point, B * never provides any information about its input state. We now prove that the simulation of an early abort is correct. We only provide the proof that the simulator does the job when the adversaryÃ is impersonating A . The proof for an adversaryB impersonating B follows the same lines.
We define E-ABORT s as the event consisting in an execution between two parties aborting at turn s < s * . Let [Ã B ∧ E-ABORT s ] O (ρ in ) be denoting the the joint state of an execution that aborts at turn s wheneverÃ and B are interacting upon joint input state ρ in . Let [C D ∧ E-ABORT s ] F (ρ in ) be denoting an execution betweenC and D (in the ideal world) upon joint input state ρ in aborting whileC is simulatingÃ and B * at turn s upon input state tr B in (ρ
O (ρ in ) aborts at step s respectively. We have,
Lemma 6.1 (Early abort). LetÃ be an adversary in hybrid protocol
F at which B returns all ofÃ 's swaddlings in TestAllSwaddlings and let 0 ≤ s < s * . Then, there exists an adversaryC in Γ F (polysize in the size ofÃ ) such that for any
By symmetry, the same is also true with respect to adversariesB in Π O F andD in Γ F .
Proof (sketch). The proof proceeds along the same lines than in [DNS10] . Since all communications between parties are statistically encrypted, an execution betweenÃ and B upon joint input state ρ
B in is identical to an execution with joint input state ρ in from the adversary's point of view. Remember that whenC D andÃ B abort at turn s < s * , D and B output a special state |⊥ ⊥|. We have,
where (2) is a consequence of how the simulator is constructed, and (3) follows from the fact that in such executions, the output of the honest player is |⊥ ⊥|. Equation (4) follows from the hiding property at every turn stated in Lemma 5.4 . Notice that some measurements can be applied to some swaddled ancillas (initially in state |0 ) or magic states while performing VerifyMagic or evaluating an R-gate. None of these measurements can reveal anything non-negligible about B's input state. For the evaluation of an R-gate, the outcome of measurements are independent of B's input state. For the magic state distillation process, measurements are only applied to candidate magic states also independent of B's input state.
To prove the statement for adversaryB interacting with A in Π O F , we define s * to be the turn at whichB receives all his swaddlings from A . The simulatorD for executions aborting early proceeds the same way thanC except thatB replacesÃ while A * replaces B * .
Simulation of Executions that do not Abort Early
It remains to simulate the execution from turn s * until the end. In the simulated world, ifC reaches the end of Step 2 then the output state F (ρ A in R in ⊗ |0 0|) can be recovered. The reason being that at turn s * (taking place before OpenAllSwaddlings), all swaddlings have been tested by B * in TestAllSwaddlings.C can get the output state since it knows all keys allowing to decrypt all logical wires, and all these wires have not been tampered with. The simulation then works along the same lines than in [DNS10] . At turn s * ,C is simulating B * 's quantum transmission of all swaddlings belonging toÃ back toÃ . These swaddlings have been successfully tested by B * in TestAllSwaddlings.C intercepts all these swaddlings and decrypts them together with all swaddlings held by B * .C then recovers the output state.C undoes the quantum operation F in order to recoverÃ 's effective input state before querying F 1 with the effective input state. This operation is performed using U † F ∈ U(A out ⊗ A a ⊗ B out ⊗ B a ), where U F is the unitary implemented by the circuit as defined in Sect. 5.1. Obviously, U † F has the same circuit complexity than U F .
Then,C swaddles back the answer to the query using the same keys. The swaddlings are finally sent toÃ before resuming the interaction betweenÃ and B * . Two things can happen during the execution of OpenAllSwaddlings: 1)Ã 's behavior makes the execution abort, and 2)Ã and B reach the end of the execution in normal conditions. In the first case,Ã may even get the output state of the computation while preventing B from recovering his own. When the output state is available toÃ ,C will need to call F 1 (withÃ 's effective input) and F 2 where the later call is without fairness (i.e., f = 0) whenÃ prevents B from decrypting his output logical wires.
More precisely, the simulatorC will proceed as follows for the rest of the simulation:
3. WhenC receives from B * all ofÃ 's swaddlings in TestAllSwaddlings, it decrypts them together with all of B * 's swaddlings. This can be done sinceC knows all (classical) encryption keys. The ancilla held in register Z is also decrypted. 4. The output of the computation (i.e., betweenÃ and B * ) is now available toC .C then runs U † F upon the output registers in order to recoverÃ 's effective input state. 5.C queries F 1 withÃ 's effective input state.C then re-swaddles all ofÃ 's logical wires (now storing the real-world output of the computation) using all secret keys used byC at Step 3.C then sends all ofÃ 's swaddlings back toÃ . 6.Ã and B * resume their execution from turn s * onward. IfÃ aborts the execution before B * gets his output state thenC queries F 2 with f = 0 otherwiseC queries F 2 with f = 1.C deletes all its internal registers except the ones held byÃ .
Let E-ABORT be the event of not having E-ABORT s at any turn s < s * . Let [Ã B ∧ E-ABORT] O (ρ in ) be denoting an execution betweenÃ and B upon joint input state ρ in that does not abort before turn s * . Let [C D ∧ E-ABORT] F (ρ in ) be denoting an execution betweeñ C and B, where the simulatedÃ and B * do not abort before turn s * upon joint input state
Next lemma establishes the active security when no early aborting occurs. The following lemma follows from the forcingness of the protocol established in Lemma 5.5.
Lemma 6.2 (No early abort). For any quantum adversaryÃ in hybrid protocol
, there exists an adversaryC in Γ F (polysize in the size ofÃ and B) such that for any ρ in ∈ D(A in ⊗ B in ⊗ R),
Proof (sketch). Remember that turn s * is where B * is sendingÃ 's swaddlings after having tested them with success in TestAllSwaddlings. At Step 3,C intercepts this quantum transmission from
) be denoting the joint state whenC reaches Step 3 in the simulation above. As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 6 
since turn s * occurs before any player reveals its encryption keys to the other player. Moreover, Lemma 5.5 tells us that
whereẼ 0 is defined in Definition 5.1, G s * is the honest operation so far, andẼ does not act on any of the swaddlings held byC since B * just checked them with success (since E-ABORT) and are not held byÃ yet. At this point of the protocol, G s * corresponds to the application of U F ∈ U(A in ⊗A a ⊗B in ⊗B a ) where A a and B a are the spaces of the ancilla needed to implement F unitarily. Notice that C s * is the authentication encoding using all keys (and not only B * 's keys) since allÃ 's swaddlings have been tested with success by B * before they were returned toÃ . We have:
Using this in (5) before applying U † F • C † s * , asC does at Steps 3 and 4, results in:
At
Step 5,C calls the ideal functionality F 1 evaluating F uponÃ 's effective input together with B's input while keeping B's output state:
At this point,C encrypts/authenticates, using the same keys as before, all ofÃ 's output wires (including her part of Z and B * in ) held byC :
Applying Lemma 5.5 once again, results in:
B * in ) be denoting the joint state whenC reaches Step 6 in the simulation above. Using the triangle inequality for the trace-norm distance using (7) and (8) results in:
Equation (9) implies the statement to prove since the interaction betweenÃ and B * is resumed onceC transmittedÃ 's swaddlings back toÃ . It follows thatÃ 's further actions will produce an output at negligible distance from [Ã B ∧ E-ABORT] O (ρ in ) and sinceC deletes all of B * 's registers before getting its output.
To prove the statement for adversaryB interacting with A in Π O F is easier than for adversarỹ A . Remember that forD, s * is defined to be the turn at whichB receives all his swaddlings from A . In this case,D always allows A to get the final state of the computation since the protocol has no lack of fairness for A (i.e. f = 1 always). Apart from this difference,D proceeds in a very similar way thanC .
Conclusion
Since Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 together show that a simulator succeeds in reproducing any real execution, we conclude the active security of the protocol: Theorem 7.1 (Active security). For any polynomial-time quantum operation F : L(A in ⊗B in ) → L(A out ⊗ B out ), the two-party hybrid protocol Π O F is statistically active secure without fairness for Bob.
Since the simulator establishing Theorem 7.1 is poly-time, the result in [HSS11] allows us to conclude that instantiating all TCP oracles with computationally secure classical protocols preserves security of our protocol, provided the computational assumption is secure against quantum adversaries.
Our construction can be seen as a compiler that transforms protocols secure against specious adversaries into protocols for the same task secure against any adversary, in a spirit somewhat similar to Section 7.4 in [Gol04] . The technique we used allows us to force all players to behave speciously. It would be interesting to find out how general is this compiler in the computational setting.
4. When we compare the outputs of the simulation and the protocol, we will compare the entire view, not just the view of the corrupted party. This is usual in defining active security, as it models privacy and correctness. In [DNS10] only the view of the adversary and the simulator was compared, which is sufficient to model privacy, as it shows that whatever the adversary learns can be computed given what it is allowed to learn. When comparing also the output of the honest party in the two settings, we also show that whatever influence the adversary can have on the output of the honest party in the protocol, it could also have on the output of the honest party in the simulation. This captures that basically only input substitution is possible, which is the definition of correctness. Furthermore, privacy and correctness cannot meaningfully be separated into separate notions, which is why we capture them using one definition (cf., the discussion on page 150 in [Can00]). 5. Finally, in [DNS10] a simulator contained an explicit bit q which specified whether it would like to call the ideal functionality or not. This was needed to allow the simulator to preserve its original input. An active adversary has the power to just run the ideal functionality on a dummy input and move its original input to an ancilla if it so desires, so we can remove the explicit bit q.
Our model is reminiscent of previous models of quantum secure two-party computation, but as opposed to the UC models from [BM02,Unr10,HSS11] our model only guarantees sequential security. That said, since our simulators do not access the code of the adversary or rewind the adversary, our protocol might very well be UC secure in one of the models from [BM02, Unr10, HSS11] . However, here we want to focus on what we consider the main novelty, namely that actively secure 2-party quantum computation is possible at all, and how, and we prefer to avoid cluttering that presentation by dealing with the connoisseur details needed to obtain and prove UC security. We think this is best done in the above simple model.
C Security of the Clifford-Based QAS
For completeness, we provide the proof of security of the Clifford-based authentication scheme of [ABE08] : Theorem C.1 (Security of Clifford-based QAS). The Clifford-based QAS defined in Definition 2.3 is ε-secure for ε = 6 × 2 −n .
Proof. Let U CR be the attack unitary, and let us decompose it into the Pauli basis on C:
We also define the following:
We now compute the state given that the decoder accepts:
where (a) comes from Lemma B.3 in [ABE08] , and where P denotes the set of all Pauli operators on n qubits. Likewise, the state given that the decoder rejects is given by:
Now, it is easy to see that the trace distance in Definition 2.2 can be upper-bounded by:
D R-gate teleportation and magic state distillation
The gate teleportation protocol for the R-gate works as follows. Suppose one wants to execute R on wire w. One would need to initialize a wire m in the magic state |M :=
|0 + e iπ/4 |1 . The protocol then consists of a CNOT from m to w, and then of a measurement of w in the computational basis. If the result is 0, one does nothing, and if the result is 1, we apply the gate A := e −iπ/4 P X to m. We then rename m to w, and one can check that an R-gate has been applied to w.
We therefore need a supply of magic states for our protocol. However, we need some way of generating them securely. For this, we turn to ideas from fault-tolerant computation, more specifically from [BK05] . There, they consider a model of computation in which we can perform perfect Clifford gates, but where we only have a supply of noisy magic states. We therefore need to distill good magic states from noisy ones. We will use this technique to ensure that we have a supply of good magic states: we will first let Alice prepare a large supply of magic states, and then we will have Bob distill a smaller number of states from this untrusted supply. Bob will first test a random sample of the states to make sure that the error rate is sufficiently low, and he will then use the distillation protocol from [BK05] to get the final states.
Here we will simply state the protocol from [BK05] without attempting to explain how and why it works. The protocol is based on a CSS code which is constructed from two linear classical codes L 1 and L 2 , whose generator matrices are given in Figure D .1 along with the stabilizer generators of the resulting CSS codes.
Here's how one step of the magic state distillation works:
1. Dephase all qubits (apply A to each qubit with probability 1/2). 2. Randomly permute all the qubits. It can then be shown that, if the input has an error rate of ε, then the output error rate is ε out 40ε 3 whenever ε 0.041 (see [BK05] , Equation (38)). This means that after repeating this recursively times, we have a final error rate of ε f
We now need to ensure that, if the actual error rate was above 0.041, then the adversary would have been caught with overwhelming probability. Note that since the alleged magic states were dephased in the A-basis, this corresponds to a purely classical sampling problem: if one has a set = (n + 1)e n(0.959h(k/0.959n)−h(k/n)) . Now, it can be shown that the right-hand side is upper-bounded by (n + 1)e −0.1n whenever k/n 0.8.
E Description of the subprotocols
The ancillas swaddled during Initialization also need to have their initial state verified. We now describe the verification procedure VerifyAncilla that verifies that a swaddled ancilla is indeed in state |0 . This subprotocol relies on the ideal functionality id INTCNOT defined as follows: where C is a CNOT from the data qubit as control and Bob's first dummy qubit as target, and A and B are Cliffords of the appropriate size chosen uniformly at random.
In the above, the idea is to measure the swaddled state in the computational basis by first executing a CNOT with the swaddled state as the control and one of Bob's dummies as the target. Bob then performs the measurement implicitly when he tests his dummies in step 6. The next procedure implements the magic state distillation outlined in Appendix D.
In the above, the measurement are done by calling the subprotocol Measure, given further down.
RGate(s(w)) with w ∈ A: 1. Alice performs a swaddled CNOT with mw as a control, and w as target. 2. Alice sends s(w) to Bob. Bob runs TestSwaddling(s(w)) on it. 3. Alice runs Measure(s(w)). 4. Alice and Bob perform a TPC whose result is a Clifford which, if both measurement results were zero, updates the key, and if both measurement results were one, performs a swaddled e iπ/4 XP † and then updates the key. If the measurement results differ, then they abort. 5. Alice relabels ma,i to w.
To see that such a procedure indeed performs an R-gate, we will analyze its behavior when the w is in some arbitrary pure state α|0 + β|1 ; hence, if we include the magic state, the initial state here is 1 √ 2 (|0 + e iπ/4 |1 )(α|0 + β|1 ) .
After the CNOT, we get 1 √ 2 (α|00 + β|01 + e iπ/4 α|11 + e iπ/4 β|10 ) .
Measuring the second qubit then yields either α|0 + e iπ/4 β|1 if the measurement result was 0, and β|0 + e iπ/4 α|1 if the result was 1. This is the desired result in the first case, and performing e iπ/4 XP † in the second case also yields the same state. We now know how to perform all of these operations on swaddled states; the only difficulty is to ensure that Alice doesn't lie about the measurement result. Hence, we first copy the measurement result into another swaddled register that Bob gets, ensuring that he also gets the measurement result.
Definition F.2 (Outer swaddling operation). We define C O,a,w , Alice's outer swaddling operation for wire w, as follows:
where k a is a classical description of C a . Likewise, C O,b,w is Bob's outer swaddling operation and is defined the same way.
Definition F.3 (Swaddling pattern). For every turn s of the protocol, let A I,s (resp. B I,s ) be the set of wires for which Alice (resp. Bob) holds the inner key, and A O,s (resp. B O,s ) be the set of wires for which Alice holds the outer key. Wires that are not swaddled yet are in none of these sets, and wires which only have an inner swaddling are only in the corresponding inner set. We call these sets the swaddling pattern at turn s.
Definition F.4. Let C s be the operation that takes all the unswaddled wires and swaddles according to the swaddling pattern at turn s: 
G Proving forcingness
In the following, we will not give explicit bounds for the various negligible functions, and assume that states that have negligible trace distance to each other are equal. Explicit bounds can be derived from Theorem 2.4, which gives an upper bound on the error of the the Clifford-based QAS.
She will then send back some of these qubits to Bob. Now, since we are looking at the case where there is no abortion before the end, the fact that she passes Bob's TestDummies means that her attack can be represented by a CP map U acc on her qubits that she is not sending, as in Definition 2.2. The state after sending the qubits back to Bob is therefore
and the protocol is therefore 1-forcing forÃ so far. The rest of the protocol only involves calls to other subprotocols which are proven to be forcing later on. The proof of forcingness againstB follows the same argument.
Lemma G.2. VerifyAncilla(s(w) ) is G -forcing for anyÃ and anyB, where G (·) = |0 0| · |0 0|.
